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This thesis examines the relationship between foreign aid 
and Middle East peace. The focus of this research is on 
Israel, and its relations with Egypt, Syria and the 
Palestinians. The thesis highlights the opposing interests of 
these actors and the United States interest in the region, and 
how these contrasting views seem to be roadblocks to a 
comprehensive peace. However, there is evidence that U.S. 
foreign aid can act as compensation for the compromises 
incurred by these actors, for the sake of peace in the region. 
The thesis concludes that by inadequately addressing the 
root of the Arab-Israeli problem-territorial claims that 
essentially predate Israel's 
specifically the pre-1967 claims, 
establishment, but more 
and the security of all 
parties-U.S. foreign assistance to the region will serve as a 
band-Aid approach to regional stability. However, present 
indicators dictate that this method is meeting U.S. Middle 
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This thesis examines the relationship between United 
States' foreign aid and Middle East peace. The research 
specifically focuses on Israel, and her relations with Egypt, 
Syria and the Palestinians. These actors were chosen to be 
studied for three particular reasons. The first reason has to 
do with the importance of Israel's independence and security 
to the United States. If Israel and her neighbors come to 
peace, the United States could better secure its interest to 
preserve Israel as a free, democratic nation. Secondly, 
Egypt, Syria and the Palestinians have collective, as well as 
individually, been viewed as a significant threat to the 
security of Israel, and the stability of the region. Finally, 
in examining foreign aid and peace with Israel, Eygpt 
represents the "past" case study, the Palestinians serve as 
the "present" case study, and Syria represents the "future" 
case study. In each case study, events making peace possible 
are examined; the interests of the United States, Israel, 
Egypt, Syria and the Palestinians are explored; and the United 
States' foreign aid to Israel, and these Arab states is 
examined "before" and "after" a significant peace agreement or 
treaty. 
The United States' interest to support peace processes in 
the Middle East, is an integral part of U.S. foreign policy. 
Xlll 
Providing foreign aid, has appeared to go hand and hand with 
this support for peace. The use of foreign aid as an 
instrument to offset compromises incurred by the parties 
negotiating peace, appears to a very important aspect of 
negotiations. If such is the case, one important concern 
arises from this method of "pocketbook diplomacy." This 
concern is the idea of foreign aid being a "band-Aid" approach 
to peace, which is addressed in this thesis. As compromises 
are supported by foreign aid, and significant issues-water and 
security-are glossed over, the threat to durable peace is 
heightened. Consequently, any failure of peace between Israel 
and her neighbors, equates to a threat to the United States 
interests in the region. 
Is foreign aid a good investment in the United States 
"national interest" in the Middle East? This thesis concludes 
that supporting peace initiatives with USAID programs is 
definitely better use of the U.S. federal budget, than what 
would be incurred to conduct military operations for the sake 
of peace. However, the United States should not ignore the 
instablity that could arise from the glossing over of core 




Foreign Aid has long been a source of debate in the 
United States. The call to cut foreign aid is an ongoing 
point of contention within the American populous. The fall of 
the Soviet Union served to bring this very debate to the 
forefront of the public's concern for government spending. It 
is believed that the end of the Cold War would result in less 
need for foreign aid. In the Middle East, one of the United 
States' main reasons for providing economic and military 
assistance, was for the purpose of containing the former 
Soviet Union. In the United States' desire to prevent the 
spread of communism and prevent the former Soviet Union from 
penetrating and dominating the area, a considerable amount of 
aid was provided to Israel and Arab nations, to support the 
United States' anti-communist stand. Since the other pole of 
the bilateral power structure no longer exists, what then 
would serve as justification for the continued amount of 
dollars being invested in foreign aid to the Middle East? One 
answer to this question is the need to continue to support 
peace in the Middle East. For most of Israel's existence, the 
United States has attempted to deal with the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, and sought peace and stability in the region. There 
has always been a number of conflicts of interests on behalf 
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of Israel and her neighbors. For the purpose of this paper 
Israel's "neighbors" are defined as Egypt, Syria and the 
Palestinians. See Appendix A. Israel and her neighbors have 
had to face the fact that peace requires compromises and 
sacrifices. Has foreign aid positively contributed to 
compromises required for peace, in the case of Israel and 
Egypt, and will it in the cases of Israel and both Syria and 
the Palestinians? Or, would foreign aid serve as a fog that 
allows the real issues-that lead to lasting peace-to be 
downplayed, and thus leave an atmosphere that is still 
susceptible to unrest? 
A. FOREIGN AID DEFINED 
This paper examines United States foreign aid to the 
Middle East in support of peace and stability in the region. 
Thus, it seems only appropriate to define the purpose of 
foreign aid in general, the role of the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID), and aid in relation to 
the Middle East. 
1. General 
Foreign aid was initially created to assist in the 
recovery of the war-torn economies of Western Europe following 
World War II, during the 1960's foreign aid became an integral 
component of North-South relations. Designed to promote 
economic development through a transfer of resources and 
2 
knowledge from industrialized to developing countries, foreign 
assistance has traditionally been promoted as a tool to bridge 
the economic gap between rich and poor nations. However, some 
argue that political, structural and institutional obstacles 
on both sides have hampered aid effectiveness. 
Foreign aid has gone through significant changes in 
purpose and format since the time it emerged. During the 
1950's and 1960's, foreign aid donors focused on the financing 
of investment projects suitable to promote long-term growth in 
developing countries. Then in the 1970's, the growing human 
costs of development prompted lending aimed at poverty 
alleviation. The early 1980's brought about yet another type 
of foreign assistance, due to the development of the debt 
crisis. Designed specifically to satisfy immediate balance-
of-payment requirements, these quick-disbursement credits also 
promote more prudent macroeconomic policies and more 
efficient, market-oriented policies at the sectoral level. 
The 1990's seem to be putting a new spin on foreign aid, such 
as the key instrument for peace. 
2. USAID 
The United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) was established in 1961, by President John F. Kennedy, 
for the purpose of promoting development around the world. 
This agency has been charged with implementing programs which 
3 
further American self-interest, and demonstrate American 
humanitarian concern. The four areas that USAID works in to 
achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives are as follows: 
1) improving health and population conditions; 
2) promoting economic growth; 
3) protecting the environment; and 
4) supporting democracy. 
In addition to these four areas, USAID provides assistance to 
victims of famine and other natural and man-made disasters. 
3. Mlddle East 
Foreign aid to the Middle East predates the establishment 
of USAID. However, the data used in this paper is based on 
information provided by USAID, and looks at U.S. foreign aid 
to the Middle East between 1948 and 1995. The year 1948 
represents the establishment of Israel, and 1995 represents 
the most recent data available at the time of this writing. 
The vast majority of assistance the United States has 
provided to the Middle East has been for the purpose of 
securing a just, lasting and comprehensive peace, in order to 
further U.S. foreign policy goals in the region. Less than 
one percent of the U.S. federal budget is spent on foreign 
aid, of that one percent, 40 percent is spent in the Middle 
East. This paper will provide data on U.S. foreign assistance 
to Egypt, Israel, Syria, and the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 
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B. PUBLIC OPINION AND FOREIGN AID 
Public opinion has been credited with shaping United 
States foreign policy. The Americans opinion of foreign aid 
will be briefly discussed in this section. 
Program on International Policy Attitudes-a joint program 
of the Center for the Study of Policy Attitudes and the Center 
for International and Security Studies of the University of 
Maryland-conducted a poll 23 January 1995, on Americans and 
Foreign Aid. The following is a summary of their findings: 
An overwhelming majority of Americans embrace 
the principle that the United States should give 
some aid to help people in foreign countries who 
are in genuine need. Eighty percent of those 
polled agreed that the United States should be 
willing to share at least a small portion of its 
wealth with those in the world who are in great 
need. This attitude spread across party lines-78 
percent of Republicans agreed. A strong majority 
says that the United States is spending too much on 
foreign aid. But this attitude is based on the 
assumption that the U.S. is spending vastly more 
than it is, in fact. Asked what an 'appropriate' 
amount would be, the median level proposed was 5 
times present spending levels .... Asked to estimate 
how much of the federal budget goes to foreign aid, 
the median estimate was 15 percent, 15 times the 
actual amount of 1 percent. The average was even 
higher-18 percent. 
When informed about the actual amount of 
spending on foreign aid, a strong majority favors 
either maintaining it or increasing it. Asked how 
they would feel if the U.S. would spend 1 percent 
(the amount the U.S. does spend) 18 percent said 
this would be 'too much'-down from the 75 percent 
who had said it would be about right. 
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This is only one poll, and does not serve to provide anything 
but a glimpse at how Americans view foreign aid. Furthermore, 
the misperceptions that Americans have about foreign aid could 
lend a little insight as to why Americans feel there needs to 
be a reduction in U.S. foreign assistance levels. 
The average American doesn't realize that almost 80 
percent of foreign aid monies are spent on U.S. good and 
services. Nor do they probably realize foreign aid's direct 
connection to American jobs. What they are able to perceive 
is that the United States is providing foreign aid to a 
hostile region for reasons they can't justify in their psyche. 
The question that arises from the American people is why are 
we buying peace in the Middle East? If indeed it could be 
determined that the United States was purchasing peace, could 
this be viewed as a good investment in the United States' 
"national interest"-the selling point for the American 
populous. 
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II. AID AND PEACE WITH ISRAEL: EGYPT 
Since 1948, when Israel declared its independence, Arab 
states have been at odds with the state of Israel. The Arab-
Israeli conflict has a long history that centers around 
Israel's right to exist. Egypt has served as a major player 
in representing the Arab world's relationship toward the state 
of Israel, during Israel's long years of unrest with her Arab 
neighbors. When Israel declared its independence, her Arab 
neighbors attacked. Egypt was one of the states involved in 
this attack. In the year to follow, Egypt would come to 
arrange an armistice agreement with Israel. But, hostilities 
would continue to mount between these opposing states for 
years to come. 
The 1952 coup d'etat, in which the Egyptian monarchy was 
overthrown and a republic established, brought changes to the 
State of Egypt. The new leader, Colonel Gamel Abdel Nasser, 
would be the figure that dominated Egyptian life from the mid-
50's to late 60's. Egypt, during this period, could be viewed 
as the driving force behind Arab sentiment against Western 
imperialism. The nationalization of the Suez Canal Company in 
1956, by Nasser, brought great opposition from Britain and 
France-the principal shareholders. This lead to the pact 
these European powers made with Israel to invade Sinai in 
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October 1956. Under pressure from the United States Israel 
would withdraw from Sinai that November. 
Other opposition posed by Egypt was Nasser's attempt to 
unite Egypt and Syria into a single nation (the United Arab 
Republic), from 1958-1961. (Groisser, 1982, pp. 53) A single 
Arab nation initially composed of Egypt and Syria, with 
intentions of encompassing other Arab states, was to pose a 
strong threat to Israel, with an ultimate goal of reclaiming 
Palestine. Formation of the United Arab Republic failed in 
its purpose. The reason why this attempt at Arab Unity failed 
is because Arab nationalism was not powerful enough to 
overcome local sentiments, parochial interests, and the set of 
political symbols that prevailed in Arab society. 
Conflict between Egypt and Israel presented itself again 
in 1967 with the "Six-Day" War. The results of this war, on 
Egypt, was the loss of the Sinai Peninsula. The defeat Egypt 
suffered led to a war of attrition along the Suez Canal, which 
Nasser initiated in March 1969. Having suffered great 
territorial losses in the "Six-Day" War, Arab leaders were 
determined to go to war with Israel again to regain their 
territories. See Appendix B. In October 1973 Egypt and Syria 
conducted a surprise two-front attack on Israel for this very 
purpose. 
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The major conflicts that I have pointed out in the 
previous paragraphs, as well as other violent acts that have 
taken place across the border between Egypt and Israel, all 
indicate that these two states have had an unpeaceful history. 
How then could a peace be achieved between these warring 
parties? What were the interests of the major players in the 
Egyptian-Israeli peace process? What role, if any, did 
foreign aid play in bringing about peace between Israel and 
Egypt? These points will be discussed in this chapter. 
A. THE EVENTS MAKING PEACE POSSIBLE 
Throughout Egypt and Israel's long history of conflict, 
there were incidences in which the United States acted to 
mediate attempts to settle a peace. The move toward peace 
negotiations in 1977 was prompted by two events: 
1) the War of 1973; 1 and 
2) a change in Egyptian-Soviet relations. 
The October War resulted in improved relations between the 
United States and Egypt. In November 1973, diplomatic 
relations between Egypt and the United States were restored. 
Egypt saw its immediate postwar position as a means for 
1 The Arab-Israeli War of 1973 has different names, including the October War, the Yom 
Kippur War, and the War ofRamadan. Israelis and Jews elsewhere refer to it as the Yom Kippur 
War because it started on the Jewish Day of Atonement. Arabs call it the War of Ramadan 
because it took place during Ramadan, their month of daytime fasting. The October War and the 
War of 1973 are considered neutral terms. (Groisser, 1982, pp. 127) 
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working with the United States to secure a partial Israeli 
withdrawal from the Sinai. These improved relations were 
heightened by the effects of the 1973 Arab Oil embargo on the 
United States. 
The 1973 Arab oil embargo was an eye-opening experience 
for the United States. When the Arab world attempted such an 
embargo in 1967, the West was not so dependent on Arab oil. 
(Tessler, 1994, pp. 480) However, in 1973 the West's reliance 
on Middle East oil had undergone a significant shift. The 
Arab oil embargo, this time around, proved to be highly 
effective. Americans became much more conscious of the extent 
of their dependence on Arab oil. This was evident by the fact 
that U.S. imports of Arab oil dropped from about 1.2 million 
barrels a day, in September 1973, to fewer than 20,000 barrels 
a day in January 1974. (Tessler, 1994, pp. 480) Thus, Egypt 
had the United States' attention in the aftermath of the War 
of 1973. As a result, U.S. support of peace initiatives would 
seemingly be more even-handed, providing Egypt with the 
advantage it needed to move toward successful peace 
negotiations. 
The October War left Israel in an advantageous military 
security position. When the war was over Israel had 
recaptured most of the territory in the Sinai, which it had 
retreated from at the onset of the war. Regardless of the 
10 
territorial gain, the country had been devastated by this 
attack, and doubts about the country's military establishment 
radiated. The intelligence failures of the Israeli Defense 
Force ( IDF), and the number of casual ties suffered at the 
beginning of the war, contributed to the country's 
dissatisfaction with the military establishment. Israel's 
need to recover from this blow could be met by negotiating a 
peace. 
The second event that seemingly made peace between Egypt 
and Israel possible, was the change in Egyptian-Soviet 
relations. In July 1972, Anwar Sadat made the decision to 
remove Soviet military advisors and experts from Egypt. In 
addition, he placed Soviet bases and equipment under exclusive 
Egyptian control. (Lenczowski, 198 0, pp. 167) The intent 
behind this action was the hope of obtaining more favorable 
policies from the United States, and to clear the way for 
military action without possible Soviet interference. 
(Tessler, 1994, pp. 479) Although, the USSR resupplied the 
Arabs with arms to fight against Israel during the October 
War, it was evident to Sadat that the Soviet Union was opposed 
to Egypt going to war. This growing disillusionment with the 
Soviet Union pushed Egypt to begin distancing itself from this 
superpower. This disassociation is evident by the fact that 
11 
the Treaty of Friendship, which Egypt had signed with the USSR 
in 1971, was terminated in March 1976. 
The deteriorating Egyptian-Russian relationship was being 
replaced with an improving Egyptian-American relationship. A 
relationship that was characterized by events that indicated 
that the United States was becoming much more interested in 
the Arab world. These interests are depicted by the following 
examples: 
1) the increased amount of corporations investing 
in the Arab market; 
2) journalists, politicians, and businessmen 
providing opportunities for Arabs to express their 
views of the conflict with Israel; 
3) in 1975, Anwar Sadat began to hold frequent 
meetings with visiting American dignitaries, 
especially Members of Congress. (Spiegel, 1985, pp. 
220-222) 
As Egypt moved away from the Soviet Union, and began to 
show greater interest in improving relations with the United 
States, the opportunity for negotiating peace between Egypt 
and Israel presented itself. 
B. THE PLAYERS' INTERESTS 
The October War strengthened Egypt's case as a player in 
the Middle East. Egypt's role in the Arab world was taking on 
a new shape. As Egypt became more receptive to American peace 
initiatives, did the interests of the United States, Israel 
and Egypt coincide? The United States domestic situation 
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favored support for both the Arab world and Israel, and both 
Egypt and Israel sought the same territorial claims. 
Seemingly all three players had interests that did not 
coincide. In spite of this, in December 1973, a multinational 
conference was convened at Geneva. Representatives of the 
United States, the Soviet Union, Israel, Egypt, Jordan and the 
United Nations agreed on the need for peace negotiations. 
Five years later a tripartite conference would convene at Camp 
David. The United States, Egypt and Israel would come 
together in an attempt to set the framework for Middle East 
peace. The players' interests in negotiating an Egyptian-
Israeli peace will be discussed in the sections to follow. 
1. The United States 
After World War II, when the United States' took a more 
direct and official involvement in Middle East affairs, there 
were five central goals. These primary goals, which seem to 
be contradictory, were to: 
1) contain the Soviet Union; 
2) preserve oil resources and strategic access to 
the Middle East; 
3) foster good relations with conservative Arab 
nations; 
4) preserve security and independence of Israel; 
and 
5) preserve peace and stability in the region. 
1Groisser, 1982, pp. 170) 
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How do these goals speak to the United States' interests in an 
Egyptian-Israeli peace process? 
First, if Egypt was to come to peace with Israel and 
identify closer with the United States, Soviet penetration and 
domination of Egypt would be even more checked. Also, it 
would further support the actions that Sadat had already taken 
in pushing the Soviets out of Egypt. Second, the Arab oil 
embargo was a threat to the United States' goal to preserve 
Middle East oil resources. The embargo created an energy and 
financial crises that had to be acknowledged for the purpose 
of planning to prevent future embargoes. One plan devised by 
the United States was to draw key Arab states into America's 
political and economic orbit. It was believed that this would 
create disincentives for future oil embargoes; the Arab oil 
producers would have more to lose from a future confrontation 
with the United States. (Spiegel, 1985, pp. 226) Thus, a 
joint economic commission was created with Saudi Arabia in 
June 197 4, which soon necessitated joint commissions with 
Egypt, Jordan and Israel. (Spiegal, 1985, pp. 225) The joint 
economic commission not only supported the United States' goal 
to preserve oil resources, but it also catered to the goal in 
the region-to foster good relations with conservative Arab 
nations. 
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The alliance between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, during the 
oil embargo, increased Arab political strength. This 
coalition created another opportunity for the United States to 
meet its goal of fostering good relations with conservative 
Arab nations. Saudi Arabia was the Arab state that the United 
States had established the closest relations with after the 
Second World War, and Egypt was the Arab state that the United 
States had been anxiously trying to win over during the same 
period. Now that the richest (Saudi Arabia) and most powerful 
(Egypt) Arab countries were developing relations with the 
United States, the third of the foreign policy goals 
previously stated was being pursued. 
The United States' fourth foreign policy goal for the 
Middle East was to preserve Israel's security and 
independence. As a bordering neighbor of Israel, Egypt has 
been a powerful adversary, and a definite threat to Israel's 
security. Peace with this Arab neighbor would befit the 
United States' interest with regards to Israel's security. If 
a bordering Arab neighbor such as Egypt would come to 
recognize Israel's independence, it could set the stage for 
acceptance by other Arab countries. Recognition of Israel by 
the Arab world would support the United States' final foreign 
policy goal, which was to preserve peace and stability in the 
region. The biggest threat to peace between Israel and her 
15 
neighbors was, and is, Arab nonacceptance of the State of 
Israel, and the issues surrounding disputed territorial 
claims. If an Egyptian-Israeli peace could be settled, the 
United States goal of regional peace would have a foundation 
to build from. 
The United States had great interests in the Egyptian-
Israeli peace process. The United States' five foreign policy 
goals, toward this region, could be tremendously impacted by 
a peace treaty between these two states. 
2. Israel 
Israel's interest in negotiating peace with Egypt 
generally centered around security. Israel's security would 
encompass retaining her 1967 territorial gains, in order to 
feel secure along her borders. Israel had historically 
believed that the territories occupied as a result of the 
1967 war, gave her the depth of territory necessary to defend 
her borders without a pre-emptive strike. However, the War of 
1973 would cause this security objective to be questioned by 
the Israeli government. At the end of the 1973 war, Israel no 
longer possessed the elaborate defensive fortifications along 
the Suez Canal. In the aftermath of the October War, where 
"land for peace" initiatives were being discussed, Israel was 
definitely interested in negotiating peace, but not at the 
expense of relinquishing land. 
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The idea of secure and defensible boundaries was not 
easily defined by Israeli military leaders and government 
officials, after Egypt was successful in briefly capturing the 
Sinai Peninsula in 1973. The events of the October War had to 
indicate to Israel that topographical obstacles, strategic 
depth and defensive barriers could not, by themselves, provide 
security to the state across her borders. Israel had to come 
to realize that security could only be gained through 
acceptance of, and by, her neighbor. This acceptance could 
not effectively be resolved by the military, but would need to 
be achieved via peaceful means. The War of 1973 affected all 
aspects of the Israel's life-psychological, ideological, 
diplomatic and economic-causing Israel to pay a high price for 
her victory. The need for Israel to achieve peace with the 
Arab world, starting with Egypt, was urgent to the security, 
as well as recovery, of the state. The balance of power shift 
that was taking place in favor of the Arab world would make 
this even more of a necessity. 2 
2 Bickerton and Pearson state that the War of 1973 resulted in a balance of power shift in 
the Middle East in favor of the Arabs. This idea is supported in the following thought: "The 
Arabs had always been aware that their military, economic and political potential measured in 
terms of their population, strategic location, large territories and oil revenue resources were 
superior to their actual performance. All they needed was to co-ordinate their resources and 
activities. But they never did-political instability, incompetence and corruption, national and 
traditional rivalries, and societies unready for the demands of modem warfare all acted to prevent 
the collective decision necessary in order to act decisively against Israel. The 1973 War changed 
all that-Sadat had achieved the co-operation necessary to launch a combined attack. And it was 
a preemptive attack." (Bickerton and Pearson, 1986, pp. 149) 
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3. Egypt 
Following the War of 1973, Egypt's interest in 
negotiating a peace with Israel focused on the desire to end 
the struggle with Israel. Egypt was seemingly ready to make 
peace with Israel, and looked to call upon the rest of the 
Arab world to join. Sadat wanted Syria, Jordan and the 
Palestinians to negotiate a settlement with Israel. Egypt had 
the following interests in mind concerning settling a peace 
with Israel: 
1) Arab recognition of Israel as an independent 
state; 
2) formal renunciation of the 'liberation' of 
Palestine as an Arab national aim; and 
3) Israel's surrender of all occupied territories. (Bickerton and Pearson, 1986, pp. 149) 
These interests reflected that Egypt wasn't opposed to 
negotiating a peace without the consent or support of other 
Arab states. Egypt's cultural identification would make this 
possible. Egyptians have historically felt a much deeper 
identification with their own past and cultural heritage, and 
to some extent separated themselves from the Islamic 
traditions of other Arab states. Thus, the establishment of 
an independent Palestinian state or other Arab-centered 
issues, like East Jerusalem, tends to not have the same 
emotional or moral strength in Egypt, as it would in other 
Islamic countries. As a result, Egypt's interests toward 
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peace with Israel would focus on the good of Egypt, over the 
good of the Arab world. The good of Egypt centered around 
territorial claims to Sinai, and economic security. 
C. FOREIGN AID 
The varying differences in the interests of the players 
would somehow make their way toward peaceful relations between 
Egypt and Israel. It appeared to the United States that Egypt 
was ready to make some compromises following the October War, 
since they demonstrated an interest in negotiating peace. 
Furthermore, it seemed that the postwar political and economic 
troubles of Israel would lead the government to be more 
flexible on the issue of territorial withdrawal-a necessary 
ingredient to making peace with her Arab neighbor. The United 
States' mediating efforts would lead Egypt and Israel to come 
to consensual terms regarding disengagement of forces. 
Shuttle diplomacy3 would result in the following two 
disengagement agreements between Egypt and Israel: 
1) Sinai I Agreement, signed January 18, 1974 by 
Egyptian and Israeli chiefs of staff; and 
2) Sinai II Agreement, signed September 4, 1975 
between Egypt and Israel. (Lenczowski, 1980, pp. 
567) 
3 This term was coined as a result of the diplomatic effort undertaken by U.S. Secretary 
of State Henry A. Kissinger following the War of 1973. The expression derived from Kissinger's 
shuttling back and forth, by plane, between Jerusalem and various Arab capitals for the purpose of 
securing disengagement agreements between Israel and its Arab adversaries, Egypt and Syria. 
(Flanders, 1993, pp. 542.) 
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The Sinai I Agreement called for the withdrawal of Israeli 
forces to a line about twenty miles away from the positions 
they were holding east of the Suez Canal, and for a limited 
Egyptian force to occupy the east bank of the canal, with a 
United Nations truce force to be stationed between them. 
(Lenczowski, 1980, pp. 567) See Appendix C. 
The Sinai II Agreement provided for Egyptian advance to 
the Israeli line, and Israeli withdrawal to the east of the 
Mitla and Gidi passes, a neutral zone in which a United 
Nations force would be stationed. Furthermore, it 
incorporated the operation of radar warning systems in the 
Mitla and Gidi passes by American technicians, and Egypt's 
agreement to permit the passage of nonmilitary cargoes, bound 
for Israel, through the Suez Canal. (Lenczowski, 1980, pp. 
567) 
In the years following the Sinai I and II Agreements, the 
United States would mediate another major step toward peace 
between Egypt and Israel. This would come in the form of the 
Camp David Accords, which took place September 1978. This 
tripartite conference would result in Egyptian President Anwar 
Sadat, and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin signing two 
accords that set guidelines for achieving Middle East peace. 
United States President Jimmy Carter served as a witness to 
this agreement. After about five months of difficult 
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negotiations, both sides made several concessions that 
resulted in a Egyptian-Israel peace treaty-signed 26 March 
1979. However, foreign aid would have its role in offsetting 
these concessions. 
In the two sections to follow the role of United States 
foreign aid to Egypt and Israel will be discussed in relation 
to peace initiatives. "Before" will be defined as between 
1948 and 1973. These years were chosen to coincide with the 
establishment of Israel, and the event which acted as the 
initial catalyst for peace-the October War. "After" will 
defined as between 1974 and 1995. These years coincide with 
the first disengagement agreement, and the most recent data 
available at the time of this writing. The foreign aid 
amounts discussed in the sections to follow, are discussed in 
reference to data found in Table 1. 
1. Before 
Prior to the Sinai I and II Agreements, and Egypt's 
subsequent peace treaty with Israel, the United States never 
provided military aid to Egypt. Furthermore, economic aid was 
provided varyingly, and at relatively low levels, with the 
exception of higher levels being reached between 1960 and 
1965. For most of the years during this "before" period, 
Egypt identified closely with the Soviet Union and the Arab 
world. 
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However, Egypt's move toward the United States, and peace 
with Israel would change its relationship with the Arab 
world-increasingly isolated from the other Arab states. 
Subsequently, Egypt's policy shifted toward closer economic 
and political relations with the United States, in the belief 
that this was the practical and profitable line to follow. 
(Lenczowski, 1980, pp. 569) 
Before 1973, the highest levels Israel's military 
assistance reached was just over half a billion, and economic 
assistance never rose above $110 million. However, 
concessions and compromises incurred by negotiating peace with 
Egypt would bring about changes in these figures. 
2. After 
A month after the Sinai II Agreement, Anwar Sadat visited 
President Gerald Ford in Washington and signed a number of 
economic cooperation agreements. In 1975, U.S. economic aid 
to Egypt was at its highest level ever. In November 1977, 
Sadat made his historical visit to Jerusalem to meet with 
Israeli leaders concerning negotiating a genuine peace. The 
visit most likely was prompted by the domestic situation in 
Egypt during 1977. Sadat had to deal with recovering from 
rioting that had taken place in January, peace seemed like a 
practical means of meeting Egypt's domestic needs. (Tessler, 
1994, pp. 507-508) 
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It was previously mentioned in this chapter that both 
Egypt and Israel made concessions to reach a peace agreement. 
It has been stated that Sadat reasoned that movement toward 
peace would make it possible to reduce military expenditures 
and increase development-related spending, in order to obtain 
expanded assistance from the United States, and attract more 
private foreign investment. (Tessler, 1994, pp. 508) 
Furthermore, the rebuilding of Ismai1ia and other Egyptian 
cities along the Suez Canal could be completed. Sadat was 
encouraged along these lines by President Jimmy Carter. In 
Carter's April 1977 meeting with Sadat, he suggested that in 
ten years Washington's economic, military and political ties 
with Egypt have the potential to be as strong as those between 
Israel and the United States. (Tessler, 1994, pp. 508) 
Israel's reluctance to make meaningful concessions 
throughout the negotiations leading up to the 1979 Peace 
Treaty, seems to demonstrate that Israel didn't feel as 
strongly about peace as Egypt. The real issue was that Israel 
was not interested in total withdrawal from occupied 
territories-as requested by Egypt. Relinquishing of land, 
considered important to security, did not agree with Israel 
peace interests. At best Israel was interested in gradually 
withdrawing from Sinai, demilitarizing the Gidi and Mitla 
passes, retaining Jewish settlements in Sinai-protected by 
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Israeli troops, and freedom of navigation in the Strait of 
Tiran. The United States was pressing for a peace treaty 
between Egypt and Israel. Thus, Israel would have to make 
concessions for the sake of peace in order to continue to 
enjoy American economic and military assistance. 
Israel's security was in the interest of the United 
States, and if disengagement agreements were going to be 
signed, Israel needed to feel secure. In 1974, Israel's 
military assistance from the United States hit the $2 billion 
mark, then dropped under half a billion in 1975, and rose 
again in 197 6 to $1 billion. In 1975, Israel's economic 
assistance levels rose to just over $300 million. Then 
assistance jumped to the $700 million range, which was 
maintained throughout the rest of the 1970's. 
The 1979 peace treaty demonstrated more of the same in 
regards to increasing foreign aid to secure peace. Israel 
agreed to relinquish her military bases in Sinai, if the 
United States would help pay for new ones to be constructed in 
Israel's Negev Desert-equating to $3 billion in concession 
loans. (Tessler, 1994, pp. 510) 
There were many differing interests among the United 
States, Israel and Egypt leading to a Egyptian-Israeli peace 
treaty. The conflict of interests was accompanied by a 
turbulent negotiation process that required difficult 
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concessions to be made on behalf of Egypt and Israel. 
However, foreign assistance had its day, a peace treaty was 
signed, and in 1980 Egypt and Israel exchanged ambassadors. 
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TABLE I. U.S. Foreign Aid to Egypt and Israel 
YEARS EGYPT-ECO EGYPT-MIL ISRAEL-ECO ISRAEL-MIL 
1948 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1949 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1950 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1951 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 
1952 1.2 0.0 86.4 0.0 
1953 12.9 0.0 73.6 0.0 
1954 4.0 0.0 74.7 0.0 
1955 66.3 0.0 52.7 0.0 
1956 33.3 0.0 50.8 0.0 
1957 1.0 0.0 40.9 0.0 
1958 0.6 0.0 61.2 0.0 
1959 44.8 0.0 49.9 0.4 
1960 65.9 0.0 55.2 0.5 
1961 73.5 0.0 48.1 . 
1962 200.5 0.0 70.7 13.2 
1963 146.7 0.0 63.4 13.3 
1964 95.5 0.0 37.0 0.0 
1965 97.6 0.0 48.8 12.9 
1966 27.6 0.0 36.8 90.0 
1967 12.6 0.0 6.1 7.0 
1968 0.0 0.0 51.8 25.0 
1969 0.0 0.0 36.7 85.0 
1970 0.0 0.0 41.1 30.0 
1971 0.0 0.0 55.8 545.0 
1972 1.5 0.0 104.2 300.0 
1973 0.8 0.0 109.8 307.6 
1974 21.3 0.0 51.5 2482.7 
1975 370.1 0.0 353.1 300.0 
1976 464.3 0.0 714.4 1500.0 
1977 907.8 0.0 742.0 1000.0 
1978 I 943.0 0.2 791.8 1000.0 
1979 : 1088.1 1500.4 790.1 4000.0 
1980 I 1166.4 0.8 786.0 1000.0 
1981 1130.4 550.8 764.0 1400.0 
1982 1064.9 902.4 806.0 1400.0 
1983 I 1005.1 1326.9 785.0 1700.0 
1984 i 1104.1 1366.7 910.0 1700.0 
1985 I 1292.0 1176.7 1950.1 1400.0 
1986 I 1293.3 1245.8 1898.4 1722.6 
1987 1015.2 1301.8 1200.0 1800.0 
1988 4- 873.4 1301.5 1200.0 1800.0 1989 968.1 1301.51 1200.0 1800.0 
1990 i 1093.4 1295.9 1194.8 1792.3 
1991 997.9 1301.91 1850.0 1800.0 
~-··-! 933.3 1301.8 1200.0 1800.0 
1993 - ~ 753.2 1301.81 1200.0 1800.0 
1994 
+-
606.5 1300.81 1200.0 1800.0 
1995 ! 815.0 1301.0 1200.0 1800.0 
Note: Numbers reflect millions of U.S. dollars. *Less than $50,000. 
! ECO = Economic and MIL - Military 
Source of 1948-1994 data: U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). U.S. 
Overseas Loans and Grants. Series of Yearly Data, Volume I, Near East, Obligations and 
Loan Authorizations FY 1946-1994. 
Source of 1995 data: U.S. Department of State. Congressional Presentation for Foreign 
Operations. Fiscal Year 1997. 
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III. AID AND PEACE WITH ISRAEL: THE PALESTINIANS 
The question of Palestine has divided Arabs and Jews far 
before Israel's establishment in 1948. The Balfour 
Declaration of 2 November 1917, acted as the Jews' official 
attachment to the state of Palestine. The declaration 
essentially stated that the British government was in favor of 
the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in 
Palestine. The Zionist4 movement would focus the next 30 
years on establishing an independent Jewish state. Prior to 
World War II, the United States had not shown any great 
interest in Palestine because it was viewed as a British 
responsibility. Following WWII, the future of Palestine was 
the first issue to come before the newly established United 
Nations. A Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was set 
up, and a partition plan was devised. This plan was partially 
accepted by the Jews, and rejected outright by the Arabs. On 
29 November 1947, the General Assembly voted in favor of the 
4 Zionism called for the reversal of the Jewish dispersion (Diaspora) and the" ingathering 
ofthe exiles" to their biblical homeland. (U.S. Dept of Army, 1990, pp. 83) The goal ofthis 
nationalist movement was to create an independent Jewish state in Palestine, for the Jewish 
people. This goal would be achieved by three major means; (I) promoting systematic settlement 
ofPalestine by Jewish agriculturalist, artisans and craftsmen, (2) organizing the Jews and 
strengthening the national consciousness of Jews, and (3) seeking the approval ofwhatever 
governments were necessary to achieve the goals of Zionism. (Bickerton and Pearson, 1986, pp. 
22) The individual identified most with the emergence of modem Zionism was Theodor Herzl, 
the founder of the World Zionist Organization. 
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partition. This virtually assured a Jewish state in 
Palestine, and set the stage for what would become the first 
Arab-Israeli War-the War of Independence. 
On 14 May 1948, Palestine became the state of Israel. 
The creation of Israel, and the resulting War of Independence 
would have far-reaching international repercussions. It would 
profoundly alter the strategic and political situation in the 
Middle East. Furthermore, it would plague all peace 
negotiations attempted in the region. 
In this chapter, I will examine foreign aid and the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace process. This will be accomplished 
by discussing the events that made peace negotiations 
possible, the interests of the United States, Israel and the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and what role foreign 
aid may play in the peace process. 
A. THE EVENTS MAKING PEACE POSSIBLE 
Since the early 1970's Yasser Arafat 5 has attempted to 
use the PLO as a political means to achieve Palestinian 
interests. However, continued terrorist attacks on Israel by 
5 Yasser Arafat was the co-founder ofFatah, an Palestionian nationalist movement, that 
started out functioning underground. Fatah emerged as a functioning organization with an 
Central Committee in 1964. In 1968, Arafat was appointed the official spokesman ofFatah. In 
1969, Fatah took control of the PLO and Arafat became the Chairman of this organization. (Hart, 
1989, pp. 288) 
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leftist Palestinian liberation organizations, 6 have hampered 
Arafat' s credibility with regard to a genuine interest in 
peace. However, a significant change in the international 
community would promote an opportunity to obtain a 
comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East. Progress 
toward regional peace, and particularly Israeli-Palestinian 
peace, was prompted by a combination of two events: 
1) the fall of the Soviet Union and; 
2) the United States performance in the Gulf War. 
The fall of the Soviet Union put an end to the ability of 
Middle Eastern states to balance their power against the West. 
The fall of the Soviet Union changed the balance of power 
structure, which resulted in the United States taking the 
stage as the only world superpower. For Israel this meant 
that the United States would be revisiting the necessity for 
a strategic ally in the Middle East, where there was no longer 
a Soviet threat. This would bring rise to the question of 
foreign aid to an ally whose role had changed, especially at 
a time when foreign aid was becoming more and more unpopular 
in the United States. 
The fall of the Soviet Union had a negative strategic 
impact on the goals and objectives of the Palestinian 
6 The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Popular Front-General 
Command (PF-GC) are considered leftist organizations. 
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Liberation Organization (PLO). The PLO's strategic leverage 
made possible by the support of the Soviet Union, was no 
longer available. This led the Arab World to believe that 
American priorities in the Middle East would, even more so, 
center around the American domestic political agenda (i.e., 
Israel) . 
The fall of the Soviet Union put both the Israelis and 
Arabs in a position where their foreign policy would be 
pressured by the United States' interests in the region. 
Furthermore, both Israel and the PLO's economic problems were 
exacerbated by the fall of the Soviet Union. Israel financial 
burdens were heightened by the influx of Soviet Jews. The 
PLO's was struggling for institutional survival. 
The United States' performance in the Gulf War was also 
monumental in prompting peace in the Middle East. The United 
States, with a coalition of 30 states, was successful in 
pushing Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. Thus, what was 
considered the most powerful adversary in the region, had now 
become less of a threat. Sadam's defeat had a sobering effect 
on the Palestinians, and tilted the balance of power in the 
Middle East further in favor of Israel. 
Palestinian and Jordanian support for Iraq in the Gulf 
War divided the Arab world'and inflamed inter-Arab conflict. 
Palestinians sided with Iraq during the war because they 
32 
viewed Iraq as the only credible challenge to Israel's 
military superiority. Furthermore, they felt that Iraq could 
accomplish what Egypt and Syria had failed to accomplish in 
the 1960's-uniting the Arabs into a major regional power that 
would be a challenge to the United States. Unfortunately, 
because the Palestinians sided with Iraq, they lost support 
from the other Arab regimes, like Egypt and Syria, who had 
supported Kuwait and Saudi Arabia during this war. (Quandt, 
1993, pp. 396) Thus, Yasser Arafat must have realized that 
time was working against his interests, and the need to 
respond more positively to serious peace initiatives was 
essential. 
B. THE PLAYERS' INTERESTS 
In the aftermath of the United States' Gulf War victory 
and new stance as the only superpower, there were new 
possibilities for regional peace in the Middle East. The 
United States had a foreign policy agenda that supported both 
the interests of the Palestinians and Israel. The 
Palestinians desired a state, and Israel viewed establishment 
of a state as a significant threat to security, and an 
endangerment to the very existence of Israel. Regardless of 
these apparently conflicting interests, a peace conference was 
convened in Madrid, Spain October 1991. This conference was 
chaired by United States President, George Bush and Soviet 
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President, Mikhail Gorbachev. The purpose of the conference 
was to bring delegations from Israel, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon 
and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, together to 
participate in directed peace negotiations. The American, 
Israeli and Palestinian interests in negotiating a 
Palestinian-Israeli peace will be discussed in this section. 
1. The United States 
The United States' interests in the Middle East had not 
changed much from the goals it had when Egypt and Israel made 
moves toward peace. As mentioned in chapter two, the United 
States interests in the region were to preserve oil resources 
and strategic access to the Middle East, foster good relations 
with conservative Arab nations, preserve the security and 
independence of Israel, and preserve peace and stability in 
the region. The only foreign policy goal that had changed 
between the 1970's and 1990's, was that the fall of the Soviet 
Union eliminated the United States' necessity to contain it. 
The United States' Middle East foreign policy goals could be 
served by supporting peace negotiations between the 
Palestinians and Israel. How do the Palestinians factor into 
the United States' interest to preserve oil resources and 
strategic access to the Middle East waterways? The primary 
answer is that the Palestinian issue reaches out and touches 
those Arab countries that are key players in the United 
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States' oil and waterway interests. Various Arab regimes 
(Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt, etc.) identify with the 
Palestinian cause, and have at some point or another supported 
(financially or politically) activities to further the 
interests of the Palestinian people. The Arab summit's 
declaration of Amman in 1987, produced this statement: 
The Palestinian problem is 
problem ... as the struggle to 
which have been usurped both 
the occupied Arab territories 
Arab responsibility. (Neuman, 
the central Arab 
restore Arab rights 
in Palestine and in 
is a national inter-
1988 1 PP • 1) 
The United States' involvement with the Palestinian issue 
has roots in the United Nations established refugee camps. 
The United States made the largest contributions in support of 
Palestinian refugees-who were not integrated or absorbed into 
the societies of surrounding Arab countries, after the 1967 
war. Thus, the need to find a solution to the Palestinian 
question was paramount. 
The PLO was a threat to Israel's independence and 
security because of its acts of violence, and pursuit of Arab 
support in opposing the state of Israel. Furthermore, the PLO 
served to keep up inter-Arab conflict, which aided in dividing 
the Arab world and hindering the United States' goal to foster 
good relations with conservative Arab nations. Because of the 
PLO's anti-Israeli activities, and its connections to other 
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Arab regimes, it has been considered to hold the key to Arab-
Israeli peace. 
Here again, as in the case of Egypt and Israel, the 
United States' interests could be met if the Palestinians and 
Israel were to achieve peace. 
2. Israel 
The Jews have always argued that they had continuously 
lived in Palestine (present day Israel) even before the Arabs, 
from ancient to modern times. The importance of territorial 
claims are most evident by the ongoing struggle and conflict 
over the land Israel captured during the War of 1967. The 
Israeli-Palestinian peace process would not serve to ignore 
territorial issues. As Israel considered peace negotiations 
with the PLO, the objectives centered around three central 
goals: 
1) Israel wished to realize the Zionist dream of 
transforming Palestine into a truly Jewish state; 
2) Israel sought recognition from Arabs, 
particularly after its conquest of the remainder of 
Palestine, and other Arab territories in 1967; and 
3) Israel sought to impose its unique security 
demands on the entire region. (Jarbawi, 1995, pp. 
98-99) 
The state of Israel was divided, between the Likud government 
and the Labor party7 , at the onset of a peace process with the 
7 Likud was formed in 1973 with a program to keep territory captured in 1967. The 
party's name, Likud-Liberalim Leumi, reflects its contention that Israel is entitled to all land 
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Palestinians. In 1991 the Likud government had four strategic 
interests: 
1) to protect its claims to the West Bank; 
2) to successfully absorb Soviet Jewish immigrants; 
3) to protect the economic, military and political 
relationship with the United States; and if 
possible 
4) conclude separate peace agreements with Arab 
states. (Telhami, 1992, pp. 87) 
The policy implications for these objective would translate 
into the following: 
1) continuation of Jewish settlements in the 
occupied territories; 
2) the avoidance of any process that places 
territorial compromise on the agenda; 
3) the protection of American aid to Israel; and 
4) the advocacy of bilateral agreements with Arab 
states, especially Syria. ( Telhami, 1992, pp. 87) 
It may seem that the Likud government was entirely against a 
peace process, but the reality of the matter was that it was 
against a process that would force compromise. 
between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean. (Bank, 1995, pp. 460) Because there is little 
dissent within Likud on the issue of territory, the party is held together by is collective stance on 
this issue. On the other hand, the Labor party, is made up of various groups that have diverse 
programs and perceptions about Israel•s territorial rights and the scope of acceptable bargaining 
items in peace negotiations. (Beling, 1986, pp. 17) The Israel Labor Party was formed in 1968 
through a merger of the Israel Workers• Party, a Western oriented socialist party established in 
1929. This party has been represented in Israeli government by prime ministers David Ben-
Gurion, Moshe Sharett, Levi Eshkol, Golda Meir, Shimon Peres, and Yitzkah Rabin. (Bank, 
1995, pp.460) 
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It is not surprising that the Labor party found 
opposition with the Likud government's perspective on the 
peace process. Consequently, they attacked Likud's priorities 
and objectives for peace on the following grounds: 
1) Likud was more interested in ideology than the 
security of Israel; 
2) Likud was more worried about settlements than 
Israel's economic well-being; and 
3) Likud was more concerned with greater Israel 
than Jewish Israel. (Telhami, 1992, pp. 91) 
The Labor politicians concluded that since Likud's strategy 
was to stress bilateral negotiations with Syria and downplay 
negotiations over the West Bank and Gaza Strip, than that 
meant that the Golan Heights was more valuable to security 
than the West Bank-a concept Labor didn't agree with. The 
conflict of interests-Labor's unwillingness to conduct 
negotiations with Syria and Likud's unwillingness to deal with 
the Palestinians-divided the Israeli public, causing confusion 
and frustration at the onset of the peace process. However, 
once the Madrid negotiations began, the Likud government 
shifted the direction of its strategy, and moved its emphasis 
toward Palestinian autonomy, over a bilateral agreement with 
Syria. To negotiate peace with the Palestinians seemed more 
feasible, especially with regard to the less amount of land 
that would have to be relinquish to make peace with the PLO, 
over what it would take to make peace with Syria. 
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Israel's grounds for negotiating peace has always 
centered around the desire to engage in direct negotiations 
with separate Arab states, and to negotiate from a position of 
strength. (Khouri, 1986, pp. 37-38) The Palestinians' lack of 
support from other Arab regimes, and weak position-due to the 
Gulf War and fall of the Soviet Union-made this possible for 
Israel. Thus, Israel's interest to improve state security and 
Arab-Israeli relations, could be negotiated in favor of 
Israel. 
3. Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 
In January 1964, the first Arab Summit held a meeting in 
Cairo where the decision was made to establish the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) . 8 The purpose for establishing 
this organization was to allow the Palestinian people " ... to 
play their role in liberation of their country and their 
self-determination." (Hart, 1989, pp .163) Since its 
establishment, the PLO has been viewed as an terrorist 
organization that coordinates anti-Israel activities, with 
the proclaimed aim of destroying Israel. (Groisser, 1982, pp. 
112) This foundation taunts the atmosphere conducive for 
successful peace negotiations. 
8 Egyptian leader Colonel Gamel Abdel Nasser was the chief architect of the PLO, and 
had intended it to be a puppet org~nization that would enable him to control the activities of the 
Palestinian guerillas. 
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From its beginning, the PLO's goal was to establish a 
state for the Palestinian people. The origin of this issue 
has its roots in the refusal by the Arab states to accept the 
United Nations Partition Resolution of 29 November 1947. 9 
See Appendix D. The 1967 war resulted in Israel occupying 
territories that the Arabs claimed as theirs. Since then all 
Arab requirements for peace interest have hinged on the return 
of these territories. Initially, the Palestinians had 
aspirations of reclaiming all of Palestine, as depicted in 
Appendix E. However, lack of Arab military capabilities and 
genuine commitment to the Palestinian question would cause 
such aspirations to dissipate. Subsequently, over the years 
the Palestinians have become more willing to accept the idea 
of a Palestinian state on part of Israel-allowing the state of 
Israel to continue its existence. This position was embodied 
in the PLO's 1988 declaration of an independent state, and 
followed by the PLO's explicit recognition of the state of 
Israel. The PLO's declaration of an independent state was not 
recognized by Israel, nor most other countries of the world. 
The one central and strategic goal for the PLO, when 
entering peace negotiations with Israel, was the restoration 
of legitimate Palestinian national rights, and having a state 
9 This resolution proposed the establishment of an Arab and a Jewish state in Palestine 
(modern day Israel). (Groisser, 1982, pp. 113) 
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for the Palestinian people. ( Jarbawi, 1995, pp. 99) The 
Palestinians were interested in one thing-autonomy. However, 
this autonomy would have to be inherently different from that 
which was offered to them by the Camp David accords. The Camp 
David autonomy plan would require Palestinians to choose 
Jordanian or Israeli citizenship, something that was clearly 
unacceptable to them. The Palestinians objectives center 
around the right to self-determination, to an independent 
state, and to choose their own leader. Therefore, by the PLO 
negotiating a peace that would enable them to obtain their 
national rights in a Palestinian state was to their gain. Due 
to the fact that Israel was, in a sense, being pressured by 
the United States to negotiate a peace, the PLO felt it would 
be given a better opportunity to meet their objectives. 
The fall of the Soviet Union and the PLO's support of 
Iraq during the Gulf War, was devasting to the PLO's financial 
status. Following the Gulf War the financial aid given by the 
Gulf states to the Palestinians was considerably reduced, and 
the Palestinian communities within some of those states were 
suppressed. (Gazit, 1992, pp. 24) Thus, the PLO found itself 
in a desperate state of institutional survival, which would 
force compromises that would redefine the meaning of 
sovereignty. 
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C. FOREIGN AID 
It is possible to conclude that both Israel and the PLO 
had something to gain by entering peace negotiations. 
Likewise, they both had some real compromises that had to be 
addressed. Would foreign aid positively contribute to the 
number of compromises that would need to be negotiated by 
Israel and the PLO? 
This section will examine foreign aid levels before and 
after the 1991 Middle East Peace Conference, and the 
subsequent 1993 peace agreement between Israel and Palestine. 
The "before" period is defined as between 1948 and 1990. The 
"after" period is defined as between 1991 and 1995. The 
foreign aid amounts discussed in the sections to follow, are 
discussed in reference to data found in Table 2. 
1. Before 
Aid designated for Palestinians living in the West Bank 
and the Gaza .Strip was initiated by the U.S. Congress in 
fiscal year 1975, to " ... express American concern for 
humanitarian and development needs of the Palestinians and to 
support progress toward peace in the region." (Bahbah, 1985, 
pp. 75) When the U.S. began providing aid to the Palestinians 
it was part of Israel's budget. It wasn't until 1988-the year 
the PLO declared its independence-that aid to the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip (WB&GS) was broken out separately from 
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Israel. Between 1988 and 1990 aid to the WB&GS average around 
$2 million. 
As for Israel, aid to support Israel's security and 
economic well-being flowed at steady levels from the United 
States. Aid to Israel has been regarded by the United States 
as being necessary for regional stability. Israel's economic 
aid had grown to $1.2 billion, and her military aid had 
reached $1.8 billion, since the Egyptian-Israeli peace 
treaty-the last most significant peace arrangement concluded 
between Israel and her Arab neighbors. 
2. After 
In 1991, economic aid to Israel jumped to $1.8 
,billion-the year of the Middle East Peace Conference, in 
Madrid, Spain. However, in 1992 the amount would drop back 
down to $1.2 billion, and maintain those levels through 1995. 
As for Palestine, the WB&GS would experience a noticeable 
increase in economic aid in 1992-the year following the 
conference in Madrid. Foreign aid figures would climb from 
$7.6 million in 1992, to $32.4 million in 1993-the year the 
Declaration of Principles was signed between Israel and the 
PLO. In 1994, the amount would rise to $58.5 million, and in 
1995 it would rise again to $75 million. Economic aid to the 
WB&GS was part of the United States five-year pledge to 
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support the Palestinians, as they implemented peace agreements 
with Israel. 10 
In addition to United States aid, both Israel and 
Palestine received international assistance in support of the 
peace process. The United States is by far the largest 
bilateral donor to Israel, but other major donors who provide 
assistance to Israel include Germany, France, the Netherlands 
and Switzerland. Likewise, the United States is the largest 
bilateral donor to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, but more 
than 40 international donors have pledged $2.4 billion to 
development efforts that are to take place between 1994 and 
1998. (USAID, 1995, WB&GS section) These donors include the 
European Union, Japan and the multilateral organizations, 
including the World Bank, United Nations Relief Works Agency 
and the United Nations Development Program. On 9 January 
1996, international donors met in Paris and pledged a further 
$865 million in aid to the Palestinian National Authority. 
(MacKinnon, 1996, pp. 29) The European Union will contribute 
$120 million of new funds, Saudi Arabia $100 million, the 
World Bank $90 million, and the United States $71 million. 
10 Following the Declaration ofPrinciples in 1993, the United States pledged $500 million 
for a five-year program of assistance to the West Bank and Gaza Strip, $375 million would be 
administered by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and $125 
million through the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). (USAID Congressional 
Presentation-Fiscal Year 1996) 
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For both Israel and the PLO, negotiating peace 
contributed to their need to secure financial assistance from 
the United States. The PLO wanted to prevent its organization 
from going under. If the PLO had fallen due to lack of 
financial support, it would have been difficult for the 
Palestinian people to continue pursuing their interest. As 
far as Israel is concerned, her desire to maintain her levels 
of foreign aid from the United States, seemed secure in the 
changing world environment, where Israel's significance as a 
strategic ally was being redefined. 
45 
46 
Table 2. U.S. Foreign Aid to the West Bank/Gaza Strip and Israel 
YEARS WB&GS-ECO WB&GS-MIL ISRAEL-ECO ISRAEL-MIL 
1948 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1949 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1950 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1951 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 
1952 0.0 0.0 86.4 0.0 
1953 0.0 0.0 73.6 0.0 
1954 0.0 0.0 74.7 0.0 
1955 0.0 0.0 52.7 0.0 
1956 0.0 0.0 50.8 0.0 
1957 0.0 0.0 40.9 0.0 
1958 0.0 0.0 61.2 0.0 
1959 0.0 0.0 49.9 0.4 
1960 0.0 0.0 55.2 0.5 
1961 0.0 0.0 48.1 0.1 
1962 0.0 0.0 70.7 13.2 
1963 0.0 0.0 63.4 13.3 
1964 0.0 0.0 37.0 0.0 
1965 0.0 0.0 48.8 12.9 
1966 0.0 0.0 36.8 90.0 
1967 0.0 0.0 6.1 7.0 
1968 0.0 0.0 51.8 25.0 
1969 0.0 0.0 36.7 85.0 
1970 0.0 0.0 41.1 30.0 
1971 0.0 0.0 55.8 545.0 
1972 0.0 0.0 104.2 300.0 
1973 0.0 0.0 109.8 307.5 
1974 0.0 0.0 51.5 2482.7 
1975 0.0 0.0 353.1 300.0 
1976 0.0 0.0 714.4 1500.0 
19n 0.01 0.0 742.0 1000.0 
1978 0.0 0.0 791.8 1000.0 
1979 0.0 0.0 790.1 4000.0 
1980 0.0 0.0 786.0 1000.0 
1981 0.0 0.0 764.0 1400.0 
1982 0.0 0.0 806.0 1400.0 
1983 0.0! 0.0 785.0 1700.0 
1984 0.0 0.0 910.0 1700.0 
1985 0.0 0.0 1950.1 1400.0 
1986 0.0 0.0 1898.4 1722.6 
1987 0.01 0.0 1200.0 1800.0 
1988 1.71 0.0 1200.0 1800.0 
1989 2.1 i 0.01 1200.0 1800.0 
1990 2.21 0.01 1194.8 1792.3 
1991 2.31 0.0 1850.0i 1800.0 
1992 7.6! 0.0 1200.0! 1800.0 
1993 32.4j 0.01 1200.0! -~ 1994 58.51 0.0 12oo.o: 1800.0 
.. 
1995 75.0j o.o: 1200.01 1800.0 
Note: Numbers reflect millions of U.S. dollars. • Less than $50,000. 
ECO = Economic; MIL= Military; WB&GS =West Bank&Gaza Strip 
Source of 1948-1994 data: U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). U.S. 
Overseas Loans and Grants. Series of Yearly Data, Volume t Near East, Obligations and 
Loan Authorizations FY 1946-1994. 
Source of 1995 data: U.S. Department of State. Congressional Presentation for Foreign 
Operations. Fiscal Year 1997. 
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IV. AID AND PEACE WITH ISRAEL: SYRIA 
It was mentioned in chapter two that Egypt served as one 
of the major players in determining Arab sentiment regarding 
the state of Israel. At this junction I would state that the 
other major player is Syria. Hinnebush made the following 
observation concerning the role of Egypt and Syria in the Arab 
state system: 
Egypt and Syria are the core actors around 
which the Arab state system revolves. When 
Egypt and Syria are united they constitute a 
powerful axis which can impose certain 
cohesion on the Arab state system; when they 
are divided, the Arab world is condemned to 
fragmentation. (Hinnebush, 1988, pp. 179) 
Of all of Israel's neighbors, Syria holds the position of 
being the most adamant adversary. Syria was among the Arab 
states that attacked Israel on 15 May 1948-one day after 
Israel declared independence. The friction remained ever 
present along the Syrian-Israeli border, and major violent 
conflict between these two states was revisited in the "Six 
Day" War. Although Syria agreed to a cease-fire (June 10) 
immediately following the war, the Arab summit conference held 
August 19 67, in Khartoum, was boycotted by this state. 
Furthermore, the Baath Party of Syria rejected all ideas of 
compromise with Israel. 
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Syria would demonstrate its great opposition to Israel 
again in the War of 1973. As mentioned in the chapter on 
Egypt, Syrian and Egyptian forces launched this war against 
Israel in an effort to regain territories lost in 1967. It is 
worth noting here that Egypt signed a disengagement agreement 
with Israel in January 1974, it was four months later before 
Syria signed its disengagement agreement with Israel in May 
1974. This obvious lack of diplomatic agreement among these 
Arab states, may have been a sign of division to come 
regarding Egypt and Syria's united front against Israel. When 
Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979, Syria reacted 
defensively because the state would be facing a radical 
decline in its diplomatic bargaining leverage, and a worsened 
military security position vis-a-vis Israel. (Hinnebusch, 
19 8 8 ' pp . 18 6) 
Following Egypt's split from the Arab world, Syrian 
President Hafiz al Assad made attempts to put Jordan, Lebanon 
and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) under his 
leadership. In an effort to realize these aspirations Syria 
would oppose Israel in the 1982 Israeli launched "Operation 
Peace for Galilee." 11 (U.S. Dept of Army, 1988, pp. 237) Syria 
11 The intent of this campaign was to establish a security zone north of the Lebanese 
border, a distance of some forty kilometers that would be free of hostile Shia and Palestinian 
elements. However, this official intention was soon transformed into an overarching strategic 
plan for a three-pronged attack: a central advance to reach the Damascus-Beirut road and 
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and Israel would clash again in November 1985, as a result of 
Syrian opposition to Israel's air surveillance in Lebanon. 
Syria's interventions in Lebanon, support for terrorist 
activities, or pursuit of a military option against Israel, 
were not conducive for peaceful relations. What then would 
cause peace negotiations to possibly flourish between these 
two extremely antagonistic parties? 
A. EVENTS MAKING PEACE POSSIBLE 
As was the case for the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO), the events that would prompt peace talks 
between Israel and Syria was the demise of the Soviet Union, 
and the United States involvement in the Gulf War. Unlike the 
PLO, the fall of the Soviet Union was closer to home, and more 
detrimental for Syria. Syria's relationship with Moscow was 
much closer than Israel's other bordering neighbors. The 
Soviet Union had traditionally maintained a substantial arms 
commitment to Syria. Especially following the 1982 Lebanese 
fighting in Syria. (Seelye, 198 6, pp. 58) Since Syria no 
longer had Egypt as its traditional ally, a military option 
was pursued to retake the Golan Heights, without the aid of 
Egypt. Syria sought to use Soviet aid to massively reinforce 
establish a presence there; one along the coastal plain to destroy the PLO military infrastructure; 
and a third to tum eastward along the Damascus-Beirut highway and cause the Syrian forces in 
the Biqa Valley to withdraw toward the Syrian border, thereby removing the Syrian military 
presence in Lebanon. 
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its military capabilities. However, as the Soviet Union's 
position as a counterfoil to U.S. Middle East policies eroded 
in December 1991, Syria felt obliged to support and 
participate in U.S. sponsored peace initiatives. 
In regards to the Gulf War's effect on the possibilities 
for peace, the defeat of Iraq would serve to convince Arab 
militants that a military solution to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict was impossible. Furthermore, the cooperation of the 
Soviet Union with the United States during the crisis would 
demonstrate that the Cold War rules of old were being 
rewritten. (Quandt, 1993, pp. 396) There should not have 
been any question that the United States now occupied the key 
diplomatic position. Furthermore, Saddam's invasion of Iraq 
inflamed inter-Arab division. Syria elected to send troops to 
Saudi Arabia to defend against Saddam's potential invasion 
there. Thus, Syria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia united against 
Saddam in defense of Kuwait, while Jordan and the Palestinians 
supported Iraq. Saddam attempted to draw these three powerful 
Arab states to his side by attacking Israel. He reasoned that 
if he could drag Israel into the war, his Arab brothers would 
switch sides. (Quandt, 1993, pp. 395) In the final analysis, 
American pressures prevented Israel from retaliating and the 
Arab allies that were a part of this coalition stood their 
ground against Saddam. 
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For Israel, the defeat of Iraq meant that her only 
possible threat in the region was Syria. Syria ultimately was 
not a real threat for two distinct reasons. First, the Soviet 
Union had done nothing to support, nor protect the Iraqi 
regime. Consequently, one could stand to reason that if Syria 
were to war against a state vital to U.S. interests, such as 
Israel, Soviet backing would not be forthcoming. Second, due 
the fact that Syria had united with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, 
during this war, the prospects for negotiating peace were 
seemingly tangible. Without a significant opposing power in 
the region, Israel could negotiate peace from a position of 
strength. Israel has always maintained an interest to bargain 
only from a position of strength, in any attempt to attain a 
comprehensive peace. (Khouri, 1986, pp. 37) The inter-Arab 
division that the Gulf War caused, contributed to Israel's 
negotiation position. 
The change in the international environment, made 
possible by these two catalytic events-the fall of the Soviet 
Union and the Gulf War-brought about the symbolic Madrid 
conference. Arab-Israeli peacemaking was taking a new step, 
yet the varying interests of the United States, Israel and 
Syria would need to be confronted. 
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B. THE PLAYERS' INTERESTS 
Throughout the years, bilateral relations between the 
United States and Syria have ranged between grudging mutual 
accommodation and outright mutual hostility. The previous 
section of this illustrates that Syrian-Israeli relations have 
experienced more hostilities, than accommodations. In spite 
of these facts, Middle East relations had definitely changed 
after the Gulf War. However, had they changed enough that the 
goals and objectives of United States, Israel and Syria could 
concur with each other in such a way that peace agreements 
could be settled? Syria's hostile role in the region has not 
been viewed favorably by the United States, Israel held the 
Golan Heights vital to the state, and Syria insisted upon pre-
1967 borders. What do these players really hope to gain from 
a peace settlement? This vary issue will be discussed in the 
sections to follow. 
1. United States 
What was the United States' interests in Arab-Israeli 
peacemaking in 1990's? There was no opposing superpower, and 
no need for a strategic ally. Why would the United States 
again attempt to mediate a complex dispute between Israel and 
Syria? The United States has been a strong supporter of 
Israel since the 1950's. In an attempt to carry out even-
handed Middle East policy, Syria's legitimate grievances 
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against the state of Israel have been recognized by the United 
States. This is evident by the United States' continued 
endorsement-in theory-of the United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 242. 12 Because the United States has recognized 
provisions in favor of Syria, the Syrians have historically 
welcomed U.S. unpublicized diplomacy. 
Syria wasn't depending on the Soviet Union for support, 
had stood in opposition to Iraq in the Gulf War, and appeared 
to ~identify with conservative Arab states. The outstanding 
interest the United States had in Syria coming to the peace 
table was the issue of terrorism. Syria has repeatedly been 
suspected of supporting Palestinian terrorism against 
American, West European and Israeli targets in the Middle 
East, and in Western Europe. (U.S. Dept of Army, 1988, pp. 
226) Syria's connection to international terrorism has 
hindered real peace initiatives to take place. In November 
1986, the United States imposed sanctions on Syria in response 
to continued support for international terrorism. President 
Assad has denied Syrian sponsorship of terrorism, and views 
Palestinian activities on Syrian territory as cultural and 
12 This resolution was passed in' November 1967, by the Security Council, in the aftermath 
of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. The resolution became an internationally accepted basis for 
peacemaking in the Middle East. It attempted to bring demands for a final, formal peace 
agreement together with those ofEgypt, Syria and Jordan, for Israel's withdrawal from the 
territories occupied during the 1967 War-the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, 
Golan Heights, and East Jerusalem. (Krieger, 1993, pp. 786) 
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political. Although there is lack of concrete evidence that 
directly links Syria to terrorist attacks and support, this 
state is still considered a nucleus for such activities. In 
spite of this, the United States recognizes Syria a major 
player in the Middle East. The following statement has been 
made from the White House regarding Syria: 
Syria can play an important role in a key 
region of the world, but it cannot expect to be 
accepted as a responsible power or treated as one 
as long as it continues to use terrorism as an 
instrument of its foreign policy. (U.S. Dept of 
Army, 1988, pp. 227) 
President Assad has sought to keep Syria's important role ever 
present in the minds of the United States, by making it known 
that Syria should not be ignored in any comprehensive peace 
treaty. Thus, trying to persuade truth to the old adage, 
"There can be no war in the Middle East without Egypt, but 
there can be no peace in the Middle East without Syria." (U.S. 
Dept of Army, 1988, pp. 227) 
Consequently, it seemed only natural for the United 
States to take the Gulf War victory and use it as a propeller 
to bring Arabs and Israelis to the peace table. It was an 
opportunity for the United States to further some of its 
interests in the region. AMB Martin S. Indyk, U.S. Ambassador 
to Israel, suggested that peace with Syria would have an 
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effect on the containment of Iran and Iraq, and the fight 
against terrorism, which he expressed in the following views: 
There would be no room for terrorists based in 
Lebanon because it would be inconsistent to Syria's 
commitment to peace with Israel to be harboring 
people (like that). It would take the winds out of 
the sails of Hizbullah and would thoroughly isolate 
Iran. (Makovsky, 1995, pp. 8) 
Thus, peace between Syria and Israel would serve the United 
States interests with respect to containment of Iran-Iraq, 
Israeli security and control of international terrorism. 
2. Israel 
Israeli policy regarding peace settlements in the Middle 
East have been divided between the interests of the Likud and 
Labor parties. This division is especially present with 
respect to the issue of peace with Syria, which surrounds the 
Golan Heights. Following the Gulf War the Middle East Peace 
Conference of October 1991, in Madrid, served as a springboard 
for future peace talks between Israel and Syria. What was 
Israel's perspective on peace with Syria? Israel has three 
views concerning Golan: 
1) those adopting an ambivalent position with 
respect to the extent of potential withdrawal from 
the area; 
2) those stressing Israel's need to retain the 
Golan; and 
3) those advocating an almost 





These varying views made identifying Israel's interests 
concerning peace with Syria a moving target. 
In April 1992, these two states debated the meaning of 
the UN Security Council Resolution 242, and Israel continued 
to reject any exchange of occupied territory-such as the Golan 
Heights-in return for a peace settlement. In July 1992, the 
new Israeli coalition government was dominant with members of 
the Labor Party. This government did not show any interest in 
meeting Syria's minimum demand-compliance with the UN Security 
Council Resolution 242-but it did appear interested in some 
form of compromise. Israel's proclaimed unwillingness to 
relinquish land is a policy stance that has always accompanied 
Israel's peace negotiation agenda. In 1991, the Israeli 
government believed that withdrawal from the Sinai peninsula, 
in 1982, was sufficient land concession, and did not feel 
obligated to withdraw from the West Bank, the Gaza Strip or 
the Golan Heights. (Mattair, 1991, pp. 55) Yet, a phased out 
withdrawal was negotiated with the PLO with regards to the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 
If Israel was unwilling to make some type of "land for 
peace" agreement, what type of peace settlement with Syria was 
desired? Israel's Labor Party Doves argued that Syria would 
not enter into a peace agreement without getting the Golan 
Heights. Supporters of this camp further argue that security 
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is not only territory, but rather real peace, strict 
demilitarization, and security guarantees. (Muslih, 1994, pp. 
256) In the opposite camp sit members of Likud and Labor 
hardliners. They argue that no territorial compromise should 
be contemplated because Syria does not seem ready for peace, 
and cannot be trusted to honor peace. (Muslih, 1994, pp. 255) 
Both of these opposing Israeli views argue in favor of 
security for the state of Israel. The members of Labor that 
support a middle of the road policy, such as that introduced 
by former Prime Minister Yi tzhak Rabin, and in principle 
carried on by Shimon Peres, argue in favor of some land 
concessions. This middle of the road policy pulls together 
the extreme views expressed by the Labor Doves members and, 
the Likud members and Labor hardliners. 
In principle Israel's willingness to negotiate peace with 
Syria would surround four interests: 
1) Syria must spell out the nature of the peace it 
will be willing to make with Israel before Israel 
defines the extent of the withdrawal it would be 
willing to make from the Golan; 
2) an extensive security regime predicated upon 
mutuality and reciprocity must be established; 
3) Syria must engage more in public diplomacy 
designed to impress and convince Arabs and Israelis 
alike that it wants peace with Israel; and 
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4) such peace must entail full-fledged diplomatic, 
cultural, and economic relations and must not be 
encumbered by linkages to Palestine, Lebanon, and 
other Arab-Israeli problems. (Muslih, 1994, pp. 
254) 
These interests and the positions of the varying members of 
Israel's government all proclaim that security of Israel is 
the goal and objective of peace with Syria. 
3. Syria 
Syria has historically been viewed as Israel's Arab 
neighbor who was adamantly opposed to peace negotiations, but 
Syria's position on peace has often been misunderstood. 
President Hafez Assad has supported various American, Western 
European, United Nations and Arab proposals for a 
comprehensive peace settlement, because he realized that 
Israel was too powerful to be defeated in a war, and thus the 
only realistic chance of regaining the Golan Heights was 
through an international conference. (Khouri, 1986, pp. 54) 
Thus, Syria is not opposed to peace, but vehemently opposed to 
any peace that puts the Arab world-especially Syria-in a 
unfair position of negotiation. In regard to peace with 
Israel, Syria exclaims to be acting for the good of Arab 
national interests. For this reason, Syria is opposed to Arab 
states concluding separate peace agreements with Israel 
because, in Syria's opinion, this undermines Arab ambitions to 
reclaim territories, and settle the Palestinian question. 
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The most important interest that Syria has in settling 
peace with Israel is the full and unconditional compliance 
with UN Security Council Resolution 242, with specific 
interest in the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from 
territories occupied in 1967. Syria's recovery of the Golan 
Heights has become a symbol of Syrian sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. (Ben-Meir, 1994, pp. 74) Syria 
believes that normal and peaceful relations are obtainable 
through a Israeli commitment to full withdrawal from the Golan 
Heights and southern Lebanon, the granting of full control of 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to Palestinians, and a 
satisfactory solution for East Jerusalem. 
President Assad has pronounced that Syria is seriously 
interested in achieving peace without the use of force. 
Furthermore, Syria's foreign minister has talked opening 
concerning 11 full peace for full withdrawal, 11 vice Syria's 
longstanding position of a condition of non-belligerency in 
the aftermath of a peace settlement. (Seelye, 1993, pp. 107) 
C. FOREIGN AID 
Evidence dictates that foreign aid has played a role in 
bringing about compromises between Israel and its Arab 
neighbors, that probably would not have otherwise been 
reached. Would this be the case of Syrian-Israeli peace? 
Israel has expressed that the Golan plateau is of such 
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strategic value that it can not be entirely returned to Syria. 
(Muslih, 1994, pp. 254) However, Syria has adamantly 
expressed that land was required for peace. This was 
apparently recognized by the Israeli government, because in 
1994 Israel considered a plan, regarding peace with Syria, 
that did propose land concessions. This plan would be phased 
over an eight year period, in which Syria would initially be 
granted control over the four Druze settlements in the Golan 
Heights. The final phase would be a full-scale withdrawal. 
Although the Israeli public expressed discontent, and 
Syrian officials remained skeptical-toward withdrawal from the 
Golan Heights-Israel and Syria concluded a "framework 
understanding on security arrangements," in May 1995. Israel 
proposed a four-year timetable for the withdrawal of its armed 
forces from the Golan Heights, while Syria insisted on 18 
months. Both these actors have strong opinions concerning 
fulfilling their unique goals and objectives in any peace 
settlement. What role would foreign aid from the United 
States play in getting these states to conclude a peace 
treaty? 
In previous chapters the role of foreign aid only covered 
periods "before" and "after" peace agreements/treaties. In 
this chapter foreign aid's role in Syrian-Israel peace 
relations will deal with a "before" period, and the "after" 
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period will incorporate projections. The "before" period will 
be defined as between 1948 and 1974. The "after/projected" 
period will be defined as between 1975 and 1995. These 
periods were chosen to examine the significant change in aid 
following some form of peace agreement, such as the May 1974 
Disengagement agreement, and the 1991 Middle East Peace 
Conference. The foreign aid amounts discussed in the sections 
to follow, will be discussed in reference to data found in 
Table 3. 
1. Before 
Before 1974 Syria received economic aassistance from the 
United States between 1952 and 1972, for the most part this 
assistance was under $500,000. There were a few exceptions 
during the aforementioned years were assistance levels were 
above $1 million-between 1960 and 1962, when assistance to 
Syria reached a high of $37 million. During the 1960's the 
United States provided economic assistance mostly to the PL-
480 food program to generate goodwill, with the hope that 
political concessions would result from U.S. food assistance. 
Furthermore, economic aid to Syria was high during those years 
because of President John F. Kennedy's view on foreign aid. 
Although Kennedy has often been criticized for not being a 
President that viewed the Middle East as a high United States 
foreign policy issue, he was very serious about reform, 
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especially in the Middle East. Thus, Kennedy's outlook on 
foreign aid was as follows: 
The fundamental task of our foreign aid 
program in the 1960's is not negatively to fight 
communism: its fundamental task is to help make a 
historical demonstration that in the twentieth 
century, as in the nineteenth-in the southern half 
of the globe as in the north-economic growth and 
political democracy can develop hand in hand. 
(Lenczowski, 1990, pp. 73) 
The only time Syria received military aid in the "before" 
period was between 1964 and 1967. The mid to late 1960's was 
a period of time in which the Syrian government was undergoing 
frequent changes of government, resulting from the contest for 
power between centrist and leftist wings of the Baath Party. 
2. After/Projected 
The first indication of an increase in aid following 
some form of peace agreement, was when Syria received high 
levels of economic aid from the United States between 1975 and 
1979. A year after the 1974 Disengagement Agreement Syria 
reached its highest level of economic aid from the United 
States, just above $100 million. This aid was subsequently 
cut off in 1982 when Syria became heavily involved in Lebanon. 
Also throughout the 1980's Syria was increasingly identified 
to be connected with international terrorism. Following the 
1991 Middle East Peace Conference, Syria and Israel had 
engaged in 11 sessions of bilateral negotiations by October 
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1993. Subsequently, in 1993, Syria again received economic 
aid from the United States-$1.2 million. 
The concessions that are up for negotiation between Syria 
and Israel are quite significant. These two states have 
indicated that foreign aid would need to be forthcoming to 
bring about peace. The Israeli government has projected that 
it will need an additional $12 billion in aid to come down 
from the Golan Heights, and to make peace with Syria. (Bird, 
1996, pp. 15) This $12 billion would be for the following: $7 
billion to support the equipment for military provision of the 
agreement, $3 billion for unspecified water projects, and $2 
billion for relocating the 13,000 Israelis living on the 
plateau. Syrian President Assad has also apparently hinted at 
his financial requirement for making peace. In the event the 
foreign aid desires of the Israeli and Syrian government are 
truly pursued, the United States must determine if this cost 




Table 3. U.S. Foreign Aid to Syria and Israel 
YEARS SYRIA-EGO SYRIA-MIL ISRAEL-EGO ISRAEL-MIL 
1948 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1949 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1950 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1951 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 
1952 0.4 0.0 86.4 0.0 
1953 0.0 0.0 73.6 0.0 
1954 0.3 0.0 74.71 0.0 
1955 0.0 0.0 52.7 0.0 
1956 0.1 0.0 50.8 0.0 
1957 0.2 0.0 40.9[ 0.0 
1958 0.2 0.0 61.2, 0.0 
1959 1.2 0.0 49.9' 0.4 
1960 11.9 0.0 55.2[ 0.5 
1961 30.9 0.0 48.1 i . 
1962 37.6 0.0 70.71 13.2 
1963 0.4 0.0 63.4 13.3 
1964 1.9 . 37.0 0.0 
1965 1.0 . 48.8 12.9 
1966 0.4 . 36.81 90.0 
1967 2.6 . 6.1 7.0 
1968 0.1 0.0 51.8 25.0 
1969 0.3 0.0 36.7i 85.0 
1970 0.1 0.0 41.1. 30.0 
1971 0.2 0.0 55.81 545.0 
1972 0.3 0.0 104.2i 300.0 
1973 0.2 0.0 109.81 307.5 
1974 0.0 0.0 61.61 2482.7 
1975 104.6 0.0 353.1! 300.0 
1976 34.9 0.0 714.41 1500.0 
1977 99.7 0.0 742.0i 1000.0 
1978 105.4 0.0 791.81 1000.0 
1979 110.8 0.0 790.1' 4000.0 
1980 1.1 0.0 786.0' 1000.0 
1981 1.9 0.0 764.0 1400.0 
1982 0.01 0.0 806.0 1400.0 
1983 0.0 0.0! 785.0• 1700.0 
1984 0.0 0.0 910.0' 1700.0 
1985 0.0 0.0 1950.1• 1400.0 
1986 0.0 0.0 1898.4: 1722.6 
1987 0.0 0.0 1200.01 1800.0 
1988 0.0[ 0.0 1200.0' 1800.0 
1989 0.01 0.01 1200.0 1800.0 
1990 0.0 0.01 1194.8 1792.3 




- ~:~l - 1200.0 1800.0 1993 1.2: 1200.0 1800.0 
1994 0.01 0.0 1200.0' 1800.0 
1995 I 0.0 0.0 1200.0: 1800.0 
Note: Numbers reflect millions of U.S. dollars. • Less than $50,000. 
i EGO = Economic and MIL= Military 
Source of 1948-1994 data: U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). U.S. 
Overseas Loans and Grants. Series of Yearly Data, Volume I, Near East, Obligations and 
Loan Authorizations FY 1946-1994. 
Source of 1995 data: U.S. Department of State. Congressional Presentation for Foreign 
Operations. Fiscal Year 1997. 
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V. IS FOREIGN AID A BAND-AID FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACE? 
Aid in conjunction with peace agreements and treaties in 
the Middle East have traditionally followed along the lines of 
being necessary for promoting comprehensive peace in the 
region, as well as strengthening trade and other relations. 
The ultimate goal is that the United States protects its 
interests in the region. Real lasting and durable peace has 
to address the following issues: water, sovereignty, and 
security. This chapter will discuss how this method of 
"pocket diplomacy" has shown little effectiveness in 
promoting durable peace. A peace that is attainable by 
addressing the aforementioned key issues that could lead to a 
lasting peace between Israel and Egypt, the Palestinians and 
Syria. 
A. WATER 
The most significant economic issue among these states is 
water. Since Israel was founded in 1948, conflicts over water 
have been one of the main sources of conflict between the 
Israelis and Arabs, because water is directly tied to 
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territory. Israel essentially took control of two vital water 
resources with their victory in the 1967 border war: 
1) the Mountain Aquifer under the West Bank; and 
2) the Golan Heights, which forms the watershed of 
the River Jordan. 
The West Bank, to a certain extent, appears to be vital to 
Israel's water budget. Before 1967 Israel was exploiting two 
of the three major aquifers in this area, from within its own 
borders. After 1967, Israeli control of the West Bank allowed 
access to the eastern aquifer. Israel's control of the West 
Bank has been controversial because it has resulted in the 
limitation of Arab development. Thus, Palestinians argue that 
their economic well-being is hindered. 
Historically, the Palestinians and Israelis have been 
entangled in longstanding disputes with each other, that have 
impeded cooperative development and management of shared water 
resources. The fundamental problem is the question of where 
the coastal and mountains aquifers lie. One belief is that 
the coastal aquifer lies entirely with Israel, and the 
mountain aquifer extends eastward beyond the country's pre-
1967 boundary. (Hillel, 1994, pp. 204) See Appendix F. 
Another belief is that the southern tip of the coastal aquifer 
extends into the Gaza Strip, and the mountain aquifer lies in 
the Western highland of the West Bank. (Beschorner, 1992, pp. 
10) See Appendix G. It is these types of differences of 
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opinion that give insight as to why the Israelis and 
Palestinians can't seem to come to an agreement on basic water 
rights. 
In the past, to protect its water supplies, Israel has 
restricted the Palestinian residents on the West Bank, the 
right to drill into the aquifer that is lying under their 
district. (Hillel, 1994, pp. 207) Some Israeli officials have 
expressed that despite any autonomy or sovereignty granted to 
the Palestinians, Israel should retain her control of the 
water resources. This very point was expressed by the Israeli 
Agriculture Minister who stated: 
The basis for negotiation should not be to reshare 
the water, but to establish a way of running the 
water issue together, on the existing conditions of 
the division of water. 13 
Israel's position is that they don't owe the Palestinian's any 
control of water, and that they are only obligated to provide 
drinking water, which they are doing. 
The Golan Heights is also a particularly important region 
for water resources. Israel has referred to water in this 
area as being vital to her national interest, because being 
able to control the water has strategic significance. Syria 
views repossession of the Golan Heights as a means of better 
13 From a telephone interview, of 10 July 1995, with Agriculture Minister Ya'aqov Tzur 
by Jack Katzenell. "Voice oflsrael, Jerusalem." LEXIS/NEXIS: BBC Summary ofWorld 
Broadcast, 12 July 1995. 
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defending its interests in matters involving the riparians in 
the Jordan-Yarmouk basin. (Muslih, 1994, pp. 261) 
Although concessions have been made over territory, actual 
control of vital resources-such as water-will be slow coming 
or possibly even non-existent. Water is a vital and 
complicated issue, and it has to do with politics. The Arabs 
and Israelis agree on the need for water cooperation, but 
there appears to be differing opinions as to the content of 
this cooperation (i.e., sharing vs. rights). Israel does not 
seem to be interested in giving the Palestinian Authority in 
the West Bank any powers which pose a risk to the security of 
Israel. Due to the fact that water is so vital to Israel's 
national interest, relinquishing any control of water rights 
could be viewed as a risk to Israel's security. 
Hillel points out in his book, the simplistic formula of 
"land for peace" tends to ignore the fact that it is more than 
mere territory - it implies control over water. (Hillel, 1994, 
pp. 208) 
B. SECURITY 
The debate over secure borders has rested at the heart of 
the controversy over Israel's national security, and follows 
two schools of thought. One is those who support "land for 
peace," and suggest that any border is militarily defensible 
in the age of modern warfare. In their opinion, the occupied 
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territories were a liability in that they gave Israel a false 
sense of security, and gave the Arabs reason to go to war. 
The other school of thought follows along the line that 
Israel's conflict with the Arab world was fundamentally 
irreconcilable, and the territorial imperatives of Israelis 
and Arabs were mutually exclusive. Those who support this 
view argue that relinquishing control of the occupied 
territories would bring at best a temporary peace, and feared 
that the Arabs would use the territories as a springboard to 
attack the state of Israel. The military positions of Israel 
along the Golan Heights have been considered to be ideal 
geographically defensible borders. 
The Golan Heights is also important to Syria for security 
reasons. Syrian planners believe that if the Golan plateau 
were in the hands of Syrians it would provide a defensive 
depth that is indispensable for the security of Syria, but in 
the hands of Israel it poses a lethal threat to the state of 
Syria. (Muslih, 1994, pp. 259) 
In spite of the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt 
signed in 1979, Egyptian military officials, almost ten years 
later, still considered Israel to be the most serious military 
threat to their country. (Green, 1986, pp. 75) As a result, 
Egypt has sought deterrent weapons, such as short-range 
ballistic missiles, vis-a-vis Israel. Furthermore, the 
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Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty has not prevented Egypt from 
taking action in support of the Arab cause, such as the 
withdrawal of Egyptian diplomatic officials from Israel in 
protest. However, a more critical Arab issue could arise that 
would provoke Egypt to carry out more significant action, such 
as engaging in military operations that threaten the state of 
Israel. 
Another issue surrounding security, is concerns that 
foreign aid funds allocated to the Palestinians for economic 
development, could possibly be used to support rejectionist 
groups or activities. In April 1995, questions were raised by 
policymakers concerning assistance monitoring, at a hearing on 
"Middle East Overview and u.s. Assistance to the 
Palestinians," before the Committee on International 
Relations, House of Representatives. Some of the questions 
raised were: 
Does the United States have AID officials 
monitoring, Palestinian Authority spendng of U.S. 
foreign assistance? What monitoring mechanism does 
the United States have in place to ensure that no 
U.S. funds go to indi victuals who support 
rejectionist groups like Hamas? Has there been any 
evidence that private voluntary organizations 
receiving U.S. funds have diverted any of their 
funding to any individuals or organizations 
involved in rej ectionist acts or terroism? (U.S. 
Govt Printing Office, 1995, pp. 51) 
USAID ensured the Committee that there was no evidence that 
any recipient of U.S. funds in the West Bank and the Gaza 
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Strip program had diverted any funding to indi victuals or 
organizations involved in rej ectionist acts or terrorism. 
However, the fact that the questions were raised could suggest 
that the Palestinians move toward peace has not reduced the 
security concerns in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. If 
foreign aid was diverted to support acts of terrorism, the 
threat to stability and durable peace would be that much 
greater. 
In the area of security, the continuing loss of Israeli 
lives to Hamas suicide bombings and other terrorist attacks, 
serves as an indication that insecurity and mistrust is still 
an issue that is alive and well among Israel and her 
neighbors. The United States has earmarked, in its FY 1996 
Foreign Operations budget, $1.8 billion in Foreign Military 
Funds to Israel-a figure that has not decreased with the 
increasing number of peace agreements. The fact that aid is 
being provided for the very purpose of maintaining Israel's 
qualitative edge against any likely aggressor, indicates that 
the issue of security has not been dealt with significantly. 
C. SUMMARY-u. N. RESOLUTION 242 
Aid to support the Middle East Peace Process has given 
the people in the region a vital stake in maintaining the 
peace, but core issues surrounding Arab-Israeli conflict 
remain ever present. The issues of water and security are 
75 
embodied in the principles of U.N. Resolution 242, which the 
Arab states have based their standards for peace. The Oxford 
Companion to Politics of the World defined the Resolution in 
the following manner: 
The resolution was an attempt to bring Israeli 
demands for a final, formal peace agreement 
together with those of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan for 
Israel's withdrawal from the territories-the Sinai 
Peninsula, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, West Bank, 
and East Jerusalem-which it had occupied during the 
June war. 
The resolution did this by a balanced emphasis 
on 'the inadmissibility of the acquisition of 
territory by war and the need to work for a just 
and lasting peace.' It therefore called for 
'withdrawal of Israel from territories occupied in 
the recent conflict,' as well as for 'termination 
of all claims or states of belligerency and respect 
for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and political independence of 
every state in the area and their right to live in 
peace.' The resolution also called for 'a just 
settlement of the refugee problem.' (Kreiger, 1993, 
pp. 785) 
Territorial claims help to define sovereignty, which generally 
includes control over vital resource, such as water. Control 
of water can be a threat to the economy (development rights) 
and security (access and entitlement), of the state not 
controlling it. Threats to a states economy and security are 
grounds for unrest, which can dismantle peace. For example, 
in the case of the Palestinians, Israel will retain control 
over all water resources and all roads leading to Israeli 
settlements. This calls into question "respect for and 
acknowledgment of the sovereignty," as well as, "territorial 
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integrity." 
As recent as 15 December 1995, the United Nations General 
Assembly voted overwhelmingly in favor of self-determination 
for the Palestinian people, and for Israel to withdraw from 
all of the territories she has occupied since the end of the 
1967 war. 14 The General Assembly passed the resolution 143-3-
3, with Israel, the United States and Micronesia voting 
against, and Russia, Costa Rica and the Marshall Islands 
abstaining. The General Assembly and United Nations Security 
Council have repeatedly called for the end of Israeli 
occupation in the Gaza Strip, the Sinai peninsula, the West 
Bank and the Golan Heights, but the United States has used its 
veto power more than 70 times to protect Israel from Security 
Council censure. If this Resolution is not addressed in a 
manner that is satisfactory to the Arabs, the peace the United 
States is investing in will be just that, a "band-Aid" 
approach to Middle East peace. 
14 This was taken from an article titled, "U.N. Calls for Complete Israeli Withdrawal," in 





The Israeli's desire to secure aid from the United 
States, and her Arab neighbors desire to supplement their 
budgets, has definitely been met by negotiating peace. 
However, peace is supposed to result in less hostility and 
aggression, thus opening doors of opportunity for improved 
trade and international relations. Foreign aid may have 
provided a means, and an incentive to negotiate and conclude 
peace agreements and treaties, but the sustaining power of 
real, durable peace, and security for Israel, as well as its 
Arab neighbors is yet to be determined. 
The easing of East-West hostilities has both facilitated 
and complicated the North-South aid process. Movements toward 
reduction in arms and military personnel have opened the door 
to increases in economic and humanitarian assistance. 
However, domestic issues have assumed rising prominence with 
donor nations, and new aid requests have dramatically 
increased with the global upsurge in democratic and economic 
reforms. As a result, difficult choices have emerged 
regarding who merits aid, and to what degree external need 
should supersede pressing internal concerns. The United 
States' has had to make such a choice, and will have to in the 
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future when deciding to continue providing foreign aid to the 
Middle East. 
The economic recession of the United States caused 
foreign aid to be even more criticized by Americans. However, 
the use of foreign aid to secure peace in the Middle East is, 
presently, a good investment in U.S. interests in that region. 
The following briefly outlines this relationship: 
U.S. INTEREST 
l)Preserve oil resources and 
strategic access to the 
Middle East. 
2)Preserve independence and 
security of Israel. 
3)Foster good relation with 
conservative Arab nations. 
4)Preserve stability and 
peace in the Middle East. 
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FOREIGN AID INVESTMENT 
U.S. presence, cooperation 
and support to oil producing 
states have in a sense 
created a necessity for them 
to maintain good diplomatic 
relations. 
Quantity of military aid has 
definitely given Israel a 
significant military edge 
over any likely adversary. 
Financially supporting 
Israel's adversaries' peace 
initiatives, makes them less 
likely to be pose a threat. 
Providing economic and 
military aid to advance Arab 
economies and security. 
Providing economic aid to 
support peace initiations 
and implementations. 
Providing military aid to 
states that promote the 
West's interest, enabling 
them to maintain an edge 
over those who threaten 
peace and U.S. interests. 
The United States' interests are being protected by 
supporting peace in the region, even if core issues are 
glossed over by peacemaking states in· lieu of receiving 
financial assistance. The bottom line is that the price of 
peace and stability vis-a-vis economic and military assistance 
is much less costly, when compared to the price of having to 
respond to unrest and its aftermath, through costly military 
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APPENDIX B. Map of 1967 Territories Occupied by Israel 
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Source: Tessler, Mark ( 1994). A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. 
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APPENDIX C. Map of 1974 Disengagment Agreement 
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Source: Tessler, Mark (1994). A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. 
87 
88 
APPENDIX D. The U.N. 1947 Partition Plan 
SINAl 
PENINSULA 
1947j The United Nations Special Committee on 
Palestine recommended partition into two states: one 
Jewish [white on the map], one Arab [cross-hatched on 
the map]. Jerusalem was to be an internationally ad-
ministered enclave in the Arab state. 
Source: Groisser, Philip L. (1982). The United States and the Middle East. New York: State 
University ofNew York Press, Albany. 
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APPENDIX E. Map of Historial Palestine 
1920-48 / The British administered Palestine under a 
mandate from the League of Nations. In the Balfour 
Declaration of 1917, they promised to use "their best 
endeavors to facilitate" the "establishment in 
Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people." 
Source: Groisser, Philip L. ( 1982). The United States and the Middle East. New York: State 
University ofNew York Press, Albany. 
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APPENDIX F. Hillel Map of Water Aquifers 
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